Abstract: The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with singlepeaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended uniform rules proposed to solve the division problem under constraints. Rules in this family extend the uniform rule used to solve the classical division problem without constraints. We show that the family of all extended uniform rules coincides with the set of rules satisfying e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency, and independence of irrelevant coalitions.
Introduction
In the division problem an amount of a perfectly divisible good has to be allocated among a set of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of all positive amounts of the good. An agent has a single-peaked preference if he considers that there is an amount of the good (the peak) strictly preferred to all other amounts and in both sides of the peak the preference is monotonic, decreasing at its right and increasing at its left. A pro…le is a vector of single-peaked preferences, one for each agent. It would then be desirable that the chosen vector of allotments of the good depended on the pro…le. But since preferences are idiosyncratic they have to be elicited by a rule selecting, for each pro…le of single-peaked preferences, a vector of allotments adding up to the total amount of the good. But in general, the sum of the peaks will be either larger or smaller than the total amount to be allocated. Then, a rule has to solve a positive or negative rationing problem, depending on whether the sum of the peaks exceeds or falls short the amount of the good. Rules di¤er from each other on how this rationing problem is resolved in terms of its induced properties like the strategic incentives faced by agents, e¢ ciency, fairness, monotonicity, consistency, etc.
The literature on the division problem describes many examples of allocation problems that …t well with this general description. For instance, a group of agents participate in an activity that requires a …xed amount of labor (measured in units of time). Agents have a maximal number of units of time to contribute, and consider working as being undesirable. Suppose that labor is homogeneous and the wage is …xed. Then, strictly monotonic and quasi-concave preferences on the set of bundles of money and leisure generate single-peaked preferences on the set of potential allotments where the peak is the amount of working time associated to the optimal bundle. Similarly, a group of agents join a partnership to invest in a project (an indivisible bond with a face value, for example) that requires a …xed amount of money (neither more nor less). Their risk attitudes and wealth induce single-peaked preferences on the amount to be invested. Finally, a group of …rms with di¤erent sizes have to jointly undertake a unique project of a …xed size. Since they may be involved in other projects their preferences are single-peaked on their respective allotments of the project. In all these cases, it is required that a rule solve the rationing problem arising from a vector of peaks that do not add up the needed amount. The uniform rule has emerged as a satisfactory way of solving the division problem. It tries to allocate the good as equally as possible keeping the bounds imposed by e¢ ciency. Sprumont (1991) started a long list of axiomatic characterizations of the uniform rule by showing …rst that it is the unique e¢ cient, strategy-proof and anonymous rule, and second that anonymity in this characterization can be replaced by envy-freeness. Ching (1994) strengthens the results of Sprumont (1991) by showing that the uniform rule is the only one satisfying e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness and equal treatment of equals. Ching (1992) , Dagan (1996) , Schummer and Thomson (1997) , Sönmez (1994) , and Thomson (1994a Thomson ( , 1994b Thomson ( , 1995 Thomson ( , and 1997 contain alternative characterizations of the uniform rule in the division problem. In the survey on strategy-proofness of Barberà (2010) the division problem and the uniform rule play a prominent role.
However, almost all the literature on the division problem has implicitly neglected the fact that in many applications (like those described above), agents' allotments may be constrained by objective and veri…able minimal and maximal capacities which impose lower and upper bounds on them. Those constraints may come from physical, legal or economic restrictions. Most often, real-life applications of the division problem have the feature that agents'allotments are constrained. For instance in problems where the good to be divided is time, like in the internal distribution of labor in a division of a …rm, or in a bureau, or in a law …rm, or like in the assignment of teaching duties among a given set of teachers of a particular subject in a school or university department. In all those cases, constraints due to physical or legal limitations (like labor contracts) impose unavoidable bounds to the agents' allotments. But constraints also show up in problems where agents have to contribute with money to …nance a project of a …xed value, if they face budget constraints or if, due to implicit participation costs, their contributions have to be larger than a given amount (and hence, agents'allotments are bounded below as well). Big projects that can not be carried out by a single …rm may be split among a set of …rms which are not able to undertake alone the project precisely due to their capacity constraints and, in addition, each …rm participation (in order to be valuable to itself) may require receiving an allotment of the project above a given amount. Therefore, in all these cases the division problem is restricted further by feasibility constraints that are described by a family of closed intervals of nonnegative feasible allotments, one for each agent. It is then natural to assume that each agent has a closed interval of feasible allotments and his idiosyncratic preferences are single-peaked on this interval. Moreover, we will be interested in situations where agents'participation is voluntary; namely, each agent has to consider all his strictly positive feasible allotments as being strictly preferred to receive zero (the allotment associated to the prospect of nonparticipating in the division problem). What is speci…c to our paper is that we assume that each agent's allotment has to either belong to a given feasible interval of allotments or else be equal to zero. Hence, a division problem under constraints is composed by the set of agents, the amount of the good to be allocated among them, the vectors of lower and upper bounds of their feasible intervals, and their single-peaked preferences on their respective feasible intervals. We want to emphasize that our model contains all particular instances of division problems where agents'allotments are only constrained by maximal capacity restrictions because the lower bounds may be equal to zero, as in some of the real-life applications that we have just described above.
Given a division problem under constraints, it may be the case that there does not exist a vector of feasible allotments adding up to the total amount to be allocated. Hence a rule has two components. First, the choice of an admissible and non-empty subset of agents among whom it is possible to allocate the amount of the good keeping their feasibility constrains; if there is no such subset, then the rule has to choose the zero allotment for all agents. Second, and given this chosen admissible non-empty subset of agents (called participants), the rule has to assign to each participant a feasible allotment in such a way that their sum adds up to the total amount to be allocated.
Our contribution in this paper is to de…ne extensions of the uniform rule to this class of division problems under constraints and to provide an axiomatic characterization of them by using two classes of desirable properties. The …rst class is related to the behavior of the rule at a given division problem under constraints. First, e¢ ciency. A rule is e¢ cient if it always selects Pareto optimal allocations. Second, equal treatment of equals. A rule satis…es equal treatment of equals if identical participants receive the same allotment. The second class is related to the restrictions that the properties impose on a rule when comparing its proposal at di¤erent division problems under constraints. First, strategyproofness. A rule is strategy-proof if no agent can pro…tably alter the rule's choice by misrepresenting his preferences. Second, bound monotonicity. Assume that the upper bound of an agent decreases. Two situations are possible. Either the allotment of this agent in the initial problem is not larger than the new upper bound or it is strictly larger than the new upper bound. In the …rst situation bound monotonicity says that both problems must have the same allotment. In the second situation, bound monotonicity says that the agent must receive his new upper bound whereas the rest of the agents can not receive smaller allotments. Symmetric arguments can be applied when the lower bound of an agent increases. Third, consistency. Assume that after applying the rule to a given problem a subset of agents leave with their assigned allotments. Consider the new problem with the remaining set of agents and the total amount of the good minus the sum of the allotments received by the agents that already left. The rule is consistent if the allotments it proposes to the remaining agents in the reduced problem coincides with their allotments in the original problem. Fourth, independence of irrelevant coalitions. Assume the set of admissible coalitions in one problem is contained in the set of admissible coalitions in another problem and the coalition chosen by the rule in the larger problem is admissible for the smaller one, then this property says that the rule has to select the same coalition of participants in the two problems.
The main …ndings of the paper appear in two theorems. In Theorem 1 we show that in the subclass of division problems under constraints with the property that the full set of agents is admissible, the feasible uniform rule is the unique rule satisfying e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, and bound monotonicity. This result is an extension of the characterization of Ching (1994) for the uniform rule in the classical division problem. The feasible uniform rule on this subclass of division problems under constraints tries to allocate the good among all agents in the most egalitarian way respecting not only the bounds imposed by e¢ ciency, but also those imposed by the feasibility constraints. An extended uniform rule on the class of all division problems under constraints selects …rst, using a monotonic and responsive order on the family of all non-empty and …nite subsets of agents, an admissible coalition of participants (if any, otherwise it chooses the zero allotment for all agents) and then it applies the feasible uniform rule to the reduced division problem under constraints obtained by restricting the original problem to this admissible subset of participants. We show in Theorem 2 that the class of all extended uniform rules (each one associated to a monotonic and responsive order on the non-empty and …nite subsets of agents) coincides with the set of rules satisfying e¢ ciency, strategyproofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency and independence of irrelevant coalitions.
We now comment the papers of the literature more related with this one. Bergantiños, Massó and Neme (2012a, 2012b), Kibris (2003) , Kim, Bergantiños and Chun (2012) , and Manjunath (2012) have proposed extensions of the uniform rule to problems generalizing the classical division problem. Bergantiños, Massó and Neme (2012a) studies the same problem that in this paper but assuming that all lower bounds are zero and the sum of all upper bounds is larger than the total amount to be divided. Kibris (2003) studies the division problem with maximal capacity constraints assuming that we do not need to divide all the good among the agents. Bergantiños, Massó and Neme (2012b) considers the case where each agent has an idiosyncratic interval of acceptable allotments (which, in contrast with our setting here, is private information). It is showed that strategy-proofness is too demanding in this setting. Then, they study a subclass of e¢ cient and consistent rules. Kim, Bergantiños and Chun (2012) characterize two families of rules using the separability principle and other properties. In Manjunath (2012) agent's preferences are characterized by a lower and an upper bound in such a way that any agent is indi¤erent into receiving his lower (upper) bound and any amount below (above) the lower (upper) bound. The division problem with maximal capacity constraints is also considered by Moulin (1999) where the class of all …xed path mechanisms is characterized. Ehlers (2002a Ehlers ( , 2002b ) also study this class of …xed path mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. In Section 3 we de…ne several desirable properties that a rule may satisfy. In Section 4 we de…ne the feasible uniform rule (for the subclass of division problems under constraints where the grand coalition is admissible) and the extended uniform rule induced by a monotonic and responsive order on the family of all …nite and non-empty subsets of agents and state their axiomatic characterizations. Section 5 contains some …nal remarks stating other desirable properties that all extended uniform rules also satisfy. The proofs are in Section 6.
Preliminaries
Let t > 0 be an amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good. A …nite set of agents is considering the possibility of dividing t among a subset of them, to be determined according to their preferences. We will consider situations where the amount of the good t and the …nite set of agents may vary. Let N be the set of positive integers and let N be the family of all non-empty and …nite subsets of N. The set of agents is then N 2 N with cardinality n. In contrast with Sprumont (1991), we consider decision problems where the amount of the good received by each agent i 2 N is constrained either to belong to a given closed interval [l i ; u i ] [0; +1), determined by lower and upper exogenous constraints (l i and u i , respectively), or to be equal to zero. That is, an agent is either excluded from the division (and receives zero) or else his allotment has to be feasible. We are interested in settings where the participation of the agents in the division problem is voluntary in the sense that all strictly positive feasible allotments are strictly better than receiving zero. Thus, agent i's preferences i are de…ned on the set f0g [ [l i ; u i ], with 0 l i u i +1 and l i < +1: The set [l i ; u i ] is agent i's interval of feasible allotments. We assume that i is a complete, re ‡exive, and transitive binary relation on f0g [ [l i ; u i ]. Given i , let i be the antisymmetric binary relation induced by i (i.e., for all x i ; y i 2 f0g [ [l i ; u i ], x i i y i if and only if y i x i does not hold) and let i be the indi¤erence relation induced by i (i.e., for all x i ; y i 2 f0g [ [l i ; u i ], x i i y i if and only if x i i y i and y i i x i ). We will also assume that i is single-peaked on [l i ; u i ] and we will denote by p i 2 [l i ; u i ] agent i's peak. Formally, agent i's preferences i is a complete preorder on the set f0g [ [l i ; u i ] that satis…es the following additional properties:
Observe that agent i's preferences are de…ned on f0g [ [l i ; u i ] and are independent of t: Moreover, we are admitting the possibilities that l i = 0 and l i = p i = u i . Conditions (P.1) and (P.2) are the standard single-peaked restrictions on [l i ; u i ] while condition (P.3) conveys the minimal voluntary participation requirement that all strictly positive allotments in the feasible interval are strictly preferred to the zero allotment. A preference i of agent i is (partly) characterized by the triple (l i ; p i ; u i ). There are many preferences of agent i with the same (l i ; p i ; u i ); however, they di¤er only on how two allotments on di¤erent sides of p i are ordered while all of them coincide on the ordering on the allotments on each of the sides of p i . This multiplicity will often be irrelevant. We will assume throughout the paper that for any agent i, the bounds l i and u i are …xed and exogenously given while the preference i over the interval [l i ; u i ] is idiosyncratic and has to be elicited through a direct revelation mechanism. As we have already discussed in the Introduction, we are interested in division problems where allotments may be restricted by objective feasibility or capacity constraints while every preference i satisfying (P.1), (P.2), and (P.3) is a legitimate one for agent i. We do not assume that preferences are continuous. Actually, our domain admits non continuous preferences. It is not di¢ cult to check that our results still hold if we restrict the domain to be the class of continuous preferences satisfying (P.1), (P.2), and (P.3).
Let N 2 N be a set of agents. A pro…le N = ( i ) i2N is an n tuple of preferences satisfying properties (P.1), (P.2) and (P.3) above. Given a pro…le N and agent i's preferences A division problem under constraints (a problem for short) is a 5 tuple P = (N; t; l; u; ) where N 2 N is the …nite set of agents, t is the amount of the good to be divided, l = (l i ) i2N is the vector of lower constraints, u = (u i ) i2N is the vector of upper constraints, and is a pro…le. Although the vector of lower and upper constraints are part of the de…nition of the pro…le ; for convenience we explicitly include them in the description of a problem. Let P be the set of all problems.
Given a problem P = (N; t; l; u; ) we denote by P nl 0 i the problem obtained from P by replacing l i by l 0 i and such that the preferences of agent i on [max fl i ; l 0 i g ; u i ] coincide in both problems. Similar notation is used for P nu 0 i ; P nl 0 ; P n i and so on. Besides given P 2 P and S N; we denote by P S the problem P when considering only agents in S; namely, P S = (S; t;
A problem where all agents have single-peaked preferences on [0; +1) is known as the division problem; i.e., for all i 2 N , l i = 0, u i = +1, and (P.1) and (P.2) hold.
The set of feasible allocations of problem P is
This set is never empty since the allocation (0; :::; 0) 2 R N + is always feasible. Besides, there are problems for which (0; :::; 0) is the unique feasible allocation.
A coalition S N is admissible (at problem P ) if either S is empty or it is feasible to divide t among all agents in S; namely, coalition S 6 = ; is admissible if there exists
Hence, S 6 = ; is admissible if and only if
We denote by A (P ) the set of all admissible coalitions at problem P . The set A(P ) is non-empty because it always contains the empty coalition.
A rule f assigns to each problem P 2 P a feasible allocation; that is, f (P ) 2 F A (P ) for all P 2 P. Hence, a rule f can be seen as a systematic way of assigning to each problem P 2 P two di¤erent but related aspects of the solution of the problem.
First, an admissible coalition c f (P ) 2 A(P ) where
We refer to the agents in c f (P ) as participants. Often, and when no confusion arises because the problem P will be obvious from the context we write c f instead of c f (P ). Obviously,
Second, how the amount t is divided among the participants; i.e., if c f (P ) 6 = ; then,
We will see later that to identify rules satisfying appealing properties we may have some freedom when choosing one among all admissible coalitions while the properties will determine a unique way of dividing the amount of the good among the participants.
Properties of Rules
In this section we de…ne several properties that a rule may satisfy. The …rst four are basic and standard properties already used in many axiomatic analysis of the division problem. The last two are bound monotonicity, which restricts how the rule should change when the upper or lower bound of an agent changes, and independence of irrelevant coalitions, which restricts how the participants should be chosen.
A rule is e¢ cient if it always selects a Pareto optimal allocation.
Efficiency (ef ) For each P 2 P there is no (y i ) i2N 2 F A(P ) with the property that y i i f i (P ) for all i 2 N and y j j f j (P ) for some j 2 N:
Rules require each agent to report a single-peaked preference on f0g [ [l i ; u i ]. A rule is strategy-proof if it is always in the best interest of agents to reveal their preferences truthfully; namely, truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy in the direct revelation game induced by the rule.
Strategy-proofness (sp) For each P 2 P; i 2 N , and
Given a problem P we say that agent i 2 N manipulates f at pro…le via
A rule satis…es strong equal treatment of equals if identical agents receive the same allotment.
Strong equal treatment of equals (sete) For every P 2 P such that there are i; j 2 N , i 6 = j; and i = j then, f i (P ) = f j (P ) :
Strong equal treatment of agents is incompatible with e¢ ciency. To see that, consider any problem P where N = f1; 2; 3g; t = 10; (l i ; p i ; u i ) = (4; 5; 10) for i = 1; 2; 3; and 1 = 2 = 3 : Since the allotment ( For this reason, we restrict our attention to the weaker notion of the property requiring that only equal participants must be treated equally. The example above suggests that a rule satisfying equal treatment of equal (participants) will have to use some criteria to select among the three allotments (0; 5; 5); (5; 0; 5); and (5; 5; 0) (and corresponding set of participants); but we will deal with that later. A rule satis…es equal treatment of equals if identical participants receive the same allotment.
Equal treatment of equals (ete) For every P 2 P such that there are i; j 2 N , i 6 = j; i = j ; and i; j 2 c
We note that (sete) and (ete) coincide with the standard property of equal treatment of equals when they are applied to classical division problems.
A rule is consistent if the following requirement holds. Apply the rule to a given problem and assume that a subset of agents leave with their corresponding allotments. Consider the new problem formed by the set of agents that remain with the same preferences that they had in the original problem and the total amount of the good minus the sum of the allotments received by the subset of agents that already left. Then, the rule does not require to reallocate the allotments of the remaining agents.
Consistency (cons) For each problem P 2 P, each non-empty subset of agents S N; and each i 2 S,
We now introduce the property of bound monotonicity, which imposes restrictions on how the rule changes when the upper or lower bounds of the interval of feasible allotments of one agent changes. Take a problem P where the upper bound of agent k decreases to u 0 k < u k without changing his preferences (i.e.,
. A natural notion of bound monotonicity says the following. First, assume that f k (P ) u 0 k ; then, f (P ) is also feasible in P nu 0 k : Bound monotonicity says that f selects the same allocation in both problems (i.e., f (P nu
If we can divide t in P nu 0 k among the same set of agents as in P (i.e., c f (P ) 2 A (P nu 0 k )) then, bound monotonicity says that agent k receives his new upper bound (f k (P nu 0 k ) = u 0 k ) and the rest of agents receive an allotment that is not smaller than the one they received in P (i.e., f i (P nu
k is so small that we can not divide t in P nu 0 k among the same set of agents as in P (i.e., c f (P ) = 2 A (P nu 0 k )) then, bound monotonicity says nothing. We apply the same ideas to the lower bound.
We now de…ne the property of bound monotonicity formally.
Bound monotonicity (bm) (bm.1) Let P; P nu
f (P ) and
where
and
where l
The property of bound monotonicity can be seen also as a weak property of solidarity. Thomson (1994b) says: "A condition that is natural however is that agents all lose together or all gain together when the amount to divide increases, in fact when it increases or decreases. The general requirement that all agents be a¤ected in the same direction "as their environment changes" is the essence of solidarity." We can apply this solidarity principle when the environment changes because the upper bound of some agent changes (the case of a change in the lower bound is analogous). Take a problem P where the upper bound of agent k decreases to u 0 k < u k without changing his preferences. First, assume that f k (P ) u 0 k then, f (P ) is also feasible in P nu 0 k : Then, we select the same allocation in both problems (in this case we do the same as with (bm)): Second, assume that u
) and the rest of agents either all are better o¤ or all are worse o¤. Namely, either
Obviously, bound monotonicity does not imply solidarity and solidarity does not imply bound monotonicity. Nevertheless if a rule satisfy (ef ); then solidarity implies (bm) but the other implication does not hold. 2 Thus, we can see (bm) as a weaker version of solidarity.
A rule satis…es independence of irrelevant coalitions if the following requirement holds. Consider two problems where the set of admissible coalitions of the …rst one is contained in the set of admissible coalitions of the second one. Assume that the coalition chosen by the rule in the second problem is admissible for the …rst one. Then, the rule chooses the same coalition of participants in the two problems. This property is inspired in the well-known principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives. Nash (1950) de…ned it, in bargaining problems, as follows. Suppose that the set of admissible outcomes of the bargaining problem S 0 is a subset of the set of admissible outcomes of the bargaining problem S: Besides, the solution of S belongs to S 0 : Then, the solution of S 0 must be the solution of S: Notice that we are just applying the same principle to the function c f :
Independence of irrelevant coalitions (iic) For any two problems P; P 0 2 P
4 The Uniform Principle: Two Characterizations
In this section we present the two main results of the paper. The uniform rule U on problems without constraints (see Sprumont (1991) ) tries to allocate the good as equally as possible, keeping the e¢ ciency bounds binding (all agents have to be rationed in the same direction). The feasible uniform rule, on the subclass of division problems under constraints with the property that the set of all agents is an admissible coalition, does the same than U but it takes also into account the feasibility constraints. We show in Theorem 1 that the feasible uniform rule is the unique rule satisfying e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, and bound monotonicity on this subclass of problems.
Let P be the set of division problems under constraints with the property that the set of all agents is an admissible coalition; namely,
Feasible uniform rule The feasible uniform rule U on P is de…ned as follows. For each P 2 P and i 2 N;
where is the unique number satisfying P j2N U j (P ) = t: Remark 1 Consider the problem P = (N; t; l; u; ) 2 P and a division problem without constraints (N; t; 0 ) (i.e., l coincides with i on [l i ; u i ] and U (N; t; 0 ) 2 F A (P ) : Then, U (N; t; 0 ) = U (P ) : Thus, the feasible uniform rule U can be considered as an extension of the uniform rule from division problems without constraints to P . Observe that the extension of the uniform rule to problems with voluntary participation presented in Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012b) does not have this property. Let us clarify this with an example. Suppose that N = f1; 2g ; t = 10; l = (1; 3), u = (8; 8) and p = (6; 6) : Thus, U (P ) = (5; 5) whereas the rule in Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012b) chooses (4; 6); namely, it increases uniformly the allotments starting from l.
Theorem 1 in Ching (1994) provides a characterization of the uniform rule in the classical division problem with (ef ); (ete); and (sp). In Theorem 1 below we prove that if we add (bm) we have a characterization of the feasible uniform rule in P : Thus our result can be seen as an extension of Ching's result.
Theorem 1
The feasible uniform rule U on P is the unique rule satisfying e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, and bound monotonicity. Besides, the four properties are independent.
Proof See Subsection 6.1.
Remark 2 Unfortunately, U does not satisfy solidarity on P . Consider a problem P 2 P where N = f1; 2g; t = 10; l = (0; 0) ; u = (10; 10) ; and p = (8; 6) : Thus, U (P ) = (5; 5) : Therefore, it is not possible to use solidarity instead of (bm) in our results. Assume that a rule f satis…es solidarity, (ef ); (ete); and (sp): Thus, f also satis…es (bm); (ef ); (ete); and (sp): By Theorem 1, f = U; which is a contradiction because U does not satisfy solidarity. Hence, the properties of (ef ); (sp); (ete); and solidarity are incompatible in P . This fact is not surprising because solidarity is incompatible with some properties in the classical division problem, see for instance Thomson (1994b) . The example suggests that in our model the incompatibility comes mainly from (sp): As Lemma 1.2 will establish, (ef ) and (sp) imply own peak monotonicity while solidarity requires the use of the whole preferences.
We now consider the general case. We …rst extend the feasible uniform rule to P. Let P be a problem in P. An extended uniform rule selects at P the feasible set of participants by maximizing a given order (a complete, antisymmetric and transitive binary relation) on N , restricted to the family of admissible coalitions A(P ) N , and then it applies the feasible uniform rule to this selected set of participants to choose their allotments.
Extended Uniform Rule Let be an order on N . The extended uniform rule on P induced by the order on N ; denoted by U ; is de…ned as follows. For each P 2 P and i 2 N;
where c U (P ) 2 A (P ) and c
Obviously, the family of extended uniform rules on P is large. We are interested in the subfamily of rules that satisfy e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency and independence of irrelevant coalitions. To identify it we restrict the order on N to satisfy the properties of monotonicity and responsiveness.
De…nition 1
If is monotonic, then c U is maximal. Namely, if c U (P ) S; then S is not admissible.
Theorem 2 below characterizes the set of extended uniform rules that choose the admissible coalition according to a monotonic and responsive order on N . The way in which we obtain is similar to the one used in Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012b).
Theorem 2 Let f be a rule on P. Then, f satis…es e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, bound monotonicity, consistency, and independence of irrelevant coalitions if and only if f = U for some monotonic and responsive order on N . Besides, the six properties are independent.
Proof See Subsection 6.2.
Remark 3. We have formulated Theorem 2 in terms of the uniform rule but the result is more general. The proof of Theorem 2 establishes that the following statement holds. Assume that a rule on P can be characterized with a list of properties that include (ef ) and (bm): Then, this rule can be extended to the general domain P (as with U ) by adding (cons) and (iic) to the list of properties characterizing the rule on P .
Final Remarks
In this section we present some other properties that the uniform rule satis…es in the classical division problem. While some of them are satis…ed by any extended uniform rule in our setting some others are not. Nevertheless, if we proceed by weakening such properties as we did with the principle of equal treatment of equals, any extended uniform rule satis…es the new formulations of the corresponding weaker principles.
A rule is non-bossy if whenever an agent receives the same allotment at two problems that are identical except for the preferences of this agent, then the allotments of all the other agents also coincide at the two problems. Formally, Non-bossy For each problem P , each i 2 N , and each
A rule is own-peak monotonic if when the peak of an agent increases and the rest of the problem remains the same, this agent does not receive less.
Own-peak monotonicity For all P; (P n
A rule is tops-only when it depends only on the peaks of the preferences.
Tops-only For all P; (P n 0 ) 2 P,
A rule satis…es maximality if the set of participants is always maximal according to set-wise inclusion.
Maximality For any P 2 P and T N such that c f (P ) T , T is not an admissible coalition for P:
To show that any extended uniform rule on P induced by a monotonic and responsive order on N satis…es the above properties is straightforward. We state this without proof as Proposition 1 below. Proposition 1. For each monotonic and responsive order on N , the extended uniform rule U is non-bossy, own-peak monotonic, tops-only, and satis…es maximality.
We now introduce some properties that in the strong version (as in classical division problems) no extended uniform rule on P does satisfy. Nevertheless, a weaker version of them (obtained by weakening the properties as we did with equal treatment of equals) are satis…ed by every extended uniform rule on P. In all cases, when applied to classical division problems, the strong and the weak versions coincide.
The basic principle under envy-freeness is that no agent can strictly prefer the allotment received by another agent.
Strong envy freeness For each P 2 P and each i; j 2 N , f i (P ) i f j (P ) :
We weaken this notion in two ways. First, we only require to compare allotments of participants (as in the case of ete). Second, we admit unfeasible envies (when agent i envies the allocation of agent j but agent i's allocation is not feasible for agent j).
Envy freeness For each P 2 P and each pair of agents i; j 2 c f such that f j (P ) i f i (P ) ; then the vector of allotments x = (x k ) k2c f , where x i = f j (P ) ; x j = f i (P ) ; and x k = f k (P ) for all k 2 c f nfi; jg has the property that x = 2 F A (P ).
A rule is strongly individually rational from equal division if all agents receive an allotment that is at least as good as equal division.
Strongly individual rationality from equal division For each P 2 P and each i 2 N ,
We now weaken this principle by applying it only when the equal allotment is feasible.
Individual rationality from equal division For each P 2 P for which ( t n ; :::;
One-sided resource monotonicity says that if the good is scarce, an increase of the amount to be allotted should make all agents better o¤. Symmetrically, if the good is too abundant, a decrease of the amount to be allotted should make all agents better o¤.
Strong one-sided resource monotonicity For all P; (P nt 0 ) 2 P with the property that either t t
We weaken the principle by applying it only when, after changing the amount to be divided, the set of admissible coalitions does not change.
One-sided resource monotonicity For all P; (P nt 0 ) 2 P with the property that A (P ) = A (P nt 0 ) and either t t
Proposition 2 Let be a monotonic and responsive order on N . Then, the extended uniform rule U does not satisfy strong envy freeness, strong individual rationality from equal division, and strong one-sided resource monotonicity. Nevertheless, U satis…es envy freeness, individual rationality from equal division, and one-sided resource monotonicity.
Proof See Subsection 6.3.
The proof of Proposition 2 establishes the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 There is no rule on P that satis…es strong individual rationality from equal division. Moreover, let f be an e¢ cient rule. Then, f neither satis…es strong envy freeness nor strong one-sided resource monotonicity on P.
In the classical division problem, e¢ cient allocations are equivalent to same-sideness allocations; namely, P i2N p i t implies that x i p i for all i 2 N and P i2N p i < t implies that x i p i for all i 2 N: Nevertheless, this equivalence does not hold in the division problem under constraints. But …rst, we de…ne same-sideness in our model. Same-sideness Let P 2 P, x = (x i ) i2N 2 F A (P ) and
The allocation x satis…es same-sideness if P i2c x p i t implies that x i p i for all i 2 c x and P i2c x p i < t implies that x i p i for all i 2 c x .
We can adapt the de…nition of maximality for an allocation x simply by replacing c f by c x in the de…nition of maximality for a rule f: Next result establishes the relationship between e¢ ciency and same-sideness.
Proposition 3
(a) If x satis…es maximality and same-sideness, then x is e¢ cient.
(b) If x is e¢ cient, then x satis…es same-sideness but it could fail maximality.
The proof of Proposition 3 is straightforward and we omit it. Nevertheless let us clarify why e¢ ciency does not imply maximality. Assume that S is admissible for x, j = 2 S; S [ fjg is admissible for x, P i2S p i t; and
Consider a pro…le of preferences where agents in S "prefer much more"to receive an allotment above their peaks than below, then x could be e¢ cient even if it is not maximal. However, the reason of why an e¢ cient allocation is not maximal is because the inclusion of an additional agent j transforms the problem from P i2S p i t to P i2S[fjg p i > t: 3 
Proofs
We present the proofs of the main results of the paper.
Proof of Theorem 1
We …rst prove that U satis…es e¢ ciency, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, and bound monotonicity on P .
(1) U satis…es (ef ). Fix a problem P 2 P . Assume that there exists x = (x i ) i2N 2 F A (P ) with the property that x i i U i (P ) for all i 2 N: We prove that x = U (P ) : Let i 2 N be arbitrary. We consider two cases.
1. P j2N p j < t: Thus, U i (P ) = max fp i ; minfu i ; gg : In this case U coincides with the constrained uniform rule F studied in Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012a). Using 3 Namely, if S is admissible for x; j = 2 S; S [ fjg is admissible for x, P i2S p i t; and P i2S[fjg p i t, then x is not e¢ cient. the same arguments used there to prove that F satis…es (ef ) in the case P j2N p j < t, we can prove that x i = U i (P ) holds.
2.
P j2N p j t: Thus, U i (P ) = min fp i ; maxfl i ; gg : We consider three cases.
2.1. U i (P ) = p i : Since x i i U i (P ) ; it follows that x i = p i : 2.2. U i (P ) = < p i . Since x i i U i (P ) ; by single-peakedness, x i : Suppose that x i > : As P j2N x j = P j2N U j (P ) = t; there exists k 2 N such that x k < U k (P ) : We consider three cases.
2.2.2. U k (P ) = and < p k : Then, x k < ; which contradicts, by singlepeakedness, that x k k U k (P ) :
Thus, x i = and hence, x i = U i (P ):
Similarly to Case 2.2, we obtain a contradiction. Thus, x i = l i and hence, x i = U i (P ):
(2) U satis…es (sp). Fix a problem P 2 P . Let i 2 N and 0 i on [l i ; u i ] be arbitrary. We prove that U i (P ) i U i (P n 0 i ) : We consider two cases.
1.
P j2N p j < t: Thus, U i (P ) = max fp i ; minfu i ; gg : In this case U coincides with the constrained uniform rule F studied in Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012a). Using the same arguments used there to prove that F satis…es (sp) in the case P j2N p j < t, we can prove that U i (P ) i U i (P n 0 i ).
2.
P j2N p j t: Thus, U i (P ) = min fp i ; maxfl i ; gg. We consider three cases. The proofs of cases 2.1 U i (P ) = p i and 2.2 U i (P ) = < p i are similar to the proofs that F satis…es (sp) in Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012a) when P j2N p j t; and U i (P ) = p i and U i (P ) = < p i ; respectively.
We now consider the case 2.3 U i (P ) = l i > : We consider three cases. 
Since t = P j2N nfig U j (P ) + l i and p j U j (P ) for all j 2 N; t P j2N nfig p j + l i ; a contradiction.
(3) By de…nition, U satis…es (ete):
We …rst prove (bm.1 ): Let P and P 0 = P nu 0 k be as in the de…nition of (bm.1 ): We should prove that
We consider two cases.
1. P j2N p j < t: Thus, U i (P ) = max fp i ; minfu i ; gg for all i 2 N: In this case U coincides with the constrained uniform rule F studied in Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012a). Using the same arguments used there to prove that F satis…es (sp) in the case P j2N p j < t, we can prove that (bm.1 ) holds in this case.
2. P j2N p j t: Thus, U i (P ) = min fp i ; maxfl i ; gg for all i 2 N: We consider two cases.
2.1.
we deduce in both cases ( p k and > p k ) that
We now prove (bm.2 ). Let P and P 0 = P nl 0 k be as in the de…nition of (bm.2 ). We should prove that U i (P 0 ) max fU i (P ) ; l 0 i g for each i 2 N: We consider two cases.
1.
P j2N p j < t: Thus, U i (P ) = max fp i ; minfu i ; gg for all i 2 N:
, by the de…nition of U: Assume now that U k (P ) < l
1.1.
P j2N p 0 j > t: Then, for all i 2 N n fkg ;
Thus, for all i 2 N n fkg ;
We consider two cases for agent k.
; by the de…nition of U: Assume now that U k (P ) < l
Then,
0
: Proceeding as in Case 1.2, we deduce that U i (P 0 ) U i (P ) for all i 2 N n fkg : We consider three cases for agent k:
we deduce that in the two possible cases (either
We now prove that U is the unique rule satisfying the four properties on P . We do it by proving the following …ve lemmata. Lemma 1.1 Let f be a rule satisfying (ef ) and (bm) on P and let P 2 P : Then, c f (P ) = N:
Proof Let P 2 P . Consider the problem P By (bm);
Consider now the problem P 0 n fl 1 ; u 1 g (if u 0 1 = u 1 ; then the next statement holds trivially). By (bm);
Repeating this argument with agents 2; :::; n; we obtain that c f (P ) = N:
An immediate consequence of Lemma 1.1 is that if f satis…es (ef ), (bm), and (ete) on P , then for all P 2 P such that i = j we have that f i (P ) = f j (P ).
Next lemma is an extension of Lemma 1 in Ching (1994) for the classical division problem to the division problem under constraints. Lemma 1.2 Let f be a rule satisfying (ef ) and (sp) on P . Then, f is own-peak monotonic 4 .
Proof Let P; P n 0 j 2 P be such that p 0 j p j : To obtain a contradiction, assume
1. P i2N p i t: By (ef ) and Proposition 3, p i f i (P ) for all i 2 N: Hence,
which implies, by single-peakedness, that f j (P ) 0 j f j (P n 0 j ); a contradiction with (sp).
2.
P i2N p i > t: By (ef ) and Proposition 3,
2.1.
which implies, by single-peakedness, that f j (P n 0 j ) j f j (P ) ; a contradiction with (sp).
2.2.
P i6 =j p i + p 0 j < t: By (ef ) and Proposition 3, for all i 6 = j; p i
Next lemma is an extension of Lemma 2 in Ching (1994) for the classical division problem to the division problem under constraints. Lemma 1.3 Let f be a rule satisfying (ef ), (sp), and (bm) on P . Then, for all P 2 P and j 2 N :
Proof Let f be an (ef) and (sp) rule, P 2 P and j 2 N .
(a) Assume p j < f j (P ) and let 0 j be such that 0 p 0 j f j (P ) : By (ef ) and Lemma 1.1, Proposition 3 implies that
Since
We now show that f j (P n 0 j ) = f j (P ) : To obtain a contradiction, assume otherwise and consider two cases.
which implies, by single-peakedness, that
By single-peakedness,
By Lemma 1.1,
Let 00 j be such that p 00 j = p j and
By Lemma 1.2, f is own-peak monotonic. Hence, f j (P n 00 j ) = f j (P ) : By (7),
contradicting (sp).
(b) We omit the proof since it follows a symmetric argument to the one used to prove (a).
Lemma 1.4 Let f be a rule satisfying (ef ), (ete) and (bm) on P . Assume P n 0 fi;jg 2 P is such that u k = t for all k 2 N and hold.
Proof We consider three cases. 2. l i < l j : Let l j = l i and consider the preference j of agent j on [l j ; u j ] that coincides with
By (ete);
Notice that the original problem P n 0 fi;jg can be obtained from P n l j ; 0 i ; j by increasing the lower bound of agent j from l j to l j : We consider three cases.
Since the two rules satisfy (bm), f (P n 0 fi;jg ) = f (P n l j ; 0 i ; j ) and
Thus, the statement holds trivially.
By (8)
Since the two rules satisfy (bm),
Thus, by (11), (9), and (13),
and, by (12) , (10) , and (13),
Hence, the statement holds. 5 The proof of the other case is similar because we only use properties that the two rules satisfy.
2.3. max f j (P n l j ; 0 i ; j ); U j (P n l j ; 0 i ; j ) < l j : Since the two rules satisfy (bm), f j (P n 0 fi;jg ) = l j and
which means that the statement holds trivially.
3. l i > l j : The proof proceeds as in Case 2, after changing the roles of i and j.
Lemma 1.5 Let f be a rule satisfying (ef ), (sp), (ete), and (bm) on P : Then, f = U:
Proof Let P 2 P be arbitrary. We want to show that f (P ) = U (P ): Since f is (bm) we can assume through the proof that u i t for all i 2 N . Otherwise, if u k > t for some agent k take u
Assume …rst that P i2N p i t: By (ef ) and Proposition 3, f i (P ) p i for all i 2 N: Let u 
t and f satis…es (ef), by Proposition 3, f i (P 1 ) p i for all i 2 N: Since p i u i for all i 2 N; by (14) ,
Hence,
Let u 2 ) : Analogously to the previous case,
Repeating this argument we obtain that f (P n ) = f (P ) : Thus, we can assume that
Without loss of generality assume that p 1 p 2 ::: p n : To obtain a contradiction, assume that U (P ) 6 = f (P ) : Then, there exists i 1 2 N such that
Step 1: Take
such that it coincides with 1 on [max fl 1 ; l i 1 g ; t] and the peak of
By (15), we can apply Lemma 1.3 (b) with f = U and j = i 1 . Then,
By Lemma 1.2, f is own-peak monotonic. Since
By (16), (15), and (17)
Step 2: Then, there exists i 2 2 N nfi 1 g such that 
By Lemma 1.3 (b) applied to f and j = i 2 we deduce that
By (19), (18), and (20)
By Lemma 1.4,
Step 3: Then, there must exist i 3 2 N nfi 1 ; i 2 g such that 
By Lemma 1.2, f is own-peak monotonic. Since p i 3 p 0 i 3 ;
By (22), (21), and (23)
By applying Lemma 1.4 to the pairs i 3 ; i 1 and i 3 ; i 2 we obtain
Continuing with this procedure, at
Step n, we obtain that either
In both cases we have a contradiction because X
Assume now that P i2N p i < t. By (ef ) and Proposition 3, f i (P ) p i for all i 2 N: We de…ne P 0 = P nl 0 where l 0 i = 0 for all i 2 N: Obviously, P 0 2 P : Let P 0 be the subdomain of P given by problems P with the property that l i = 0 for all i 2 N: In Theorem 1 of Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012a) it is proved that there is a unique rule on P 0 satisfying (ef ), (sp), (ete), and upper bound monotonicity. This rule is called the constrained uniform rule and for all i 2 N it is de…ned as follows. For all P 2 P 0 and i 2 N;
where is such that P j2N F j (P ) = t. Since (bm.1 ) coincides with upper bound monotonicity on P 0 ; f coincides with F on P 0 : Thus, for all i 2 N;
where satis…es P j2N f j (P 0 ) = t: Besides, for all i 2 N;
where satis…es P j2N f j (P 0 ) = t: It is immediate to see that for each ; min fmax f ; p i g ; u i g = max fp i ; minfu i ; gg :
Thus, = . Hence, for all i 2 N; f i (P 0 ) = U i (P 0 ) :
Since P 1 and P 0 belong to P ; by (bm),
Let P 2 = P 1 nl 2 : Since P 1 and P 2 belong to P ; by (bm),
Repeating this argument for all i = 3; :::; n we have that f (P n ) = f (P 0 ) : Since P n = P , for all i 2 N;
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1's characterization.
We now prove that the four properties are independent.
(ef ) is independent of the other properties.
We de…ne the rule f 1 as follows. Let P 2 P . For each i 2 N;
where is such that P i2N f i (P ) = t. Then, f 1 satis…es (sp), (ete), and (bm) but fails (ef ).
(sp) is independent of the other properties.
We de…ne the rule f 2 as follows. Let P 2 P . For each i 2 N;
where is such that P i2N f 2 i (P ) = t: Then, f 2 satis…es (ef ), (ete), and (bm) but fails (sp).
(ete) is independent of the other properties.
We de…ne f 3 as the priority rule given by the order (1; 2; :::; n) applied to the set of e¢ cient allocations. Namely, let P 2 P . We de…ne f 3 formally, by considering separately the two following cases.
1.
P i2N p i t: Take k as the unique agent satisfying that
2. P i2N p i < t: Take k as the unique agent satisfying that
Then, f 3 satis…es (ef ), (sp), and (bm) but fails (ete).
(bm) is independent of the other properties.
We de…ne the rule f 4 inspired by the Constant Equal Losses rule used in bankruptcy problems. Let P 2 P . For each i 2 N;
where is such that P i2N f 4 i (P ) = t: Then, f 4 satis…es (ef ), (sp), and (ete) but fails (bm).
Proof of Theorem 2
Let be any monotonic and responsive order on N : We prove that U satis…es (ef ), (sp), (ete), (bm), (cons) and (iic) on P.
(1) U satis…es (cons). Let P 2 P, S N; and i 2 S. We must prove that
where P U ;S = S; t P j2c U (P )nS
We …rst prove that c
Since is responsive and c
P
j2c U (P ) p j t: Thus, U j (P ) = min fp j ; maxfl l ; gg p j for all j 2 c U (P ) : Then,
Thus, U j P U ;S = min fp j ; maxfl j ; 0 gg for all j 2 c U P U ;S : Since
it follows that 0 = . Hence, U i (P ) = U i P U ;S :
The proof uses symmetric arguments to those already used in Case 1
and it is omitted.
(2) U satis…es (iic). Let P; P 0 2 P be such that c
Hence, c
(3) U satis…es (ef ). Fix a problem P 2 P. Assume that there exists x = (x i ) i2N 2 F A (P ) with the property that x i i U i (P ) for all i 2 N: We prove that x = U (P ) : Since
Since is monotonic and
for all i 2 c U (P ) ;
Since P c U (P ) 2 P , U coincides with U on P c U (P ) and U satis…es (ef ) on P ; x i = U i (P ) for all i 2 c U (P ) :
(4) U satis…es (sp). Let P 2 P; i 2 N and 0 i be as in the de…nition of (sp). We must prove that
: Since P c U (P ) 2 P ; P 0 c U (P ) 2 P ; U coincides with U on P c U (P ) and P ; and U satis…es (sp) on P ; we deduce that
(5) U satis…es (ete). It is obvious from the de…nition.
(6) U satis…es (bm). We …rst prove that U satis…es (bm.1 ): Let P; (P nu
Since U satis…es (iic); c
Thus, for all i = 2 c U (P ) ;
: Since P c U (P ) 2 P ; P 0 c U (P ) 2 P ; U coincides with U on P c U (P ) and P 0 c U (P )
; and U satis…es (bm.1 ) on P ; we deduce that for all i 2 c U (P )
min U i P c U (P ) ; u 0 i = min U i P c U (P ) ; u 0 i = min fU i (P ) ; u 0 i g .
The proof that U satis…es (bm.2 ) is similar to the proof that U satis…es (bm.1 ) and it is omitted.
Let f be a rule satisfying (ef ), (sp), (ete), (bm), (cons) and (iic). We prove that there exists a monotonic and responsive order on N for which f = U .
We …rst de…ne a binary relation on N as in Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012b) Let S; S 0 2 N . Three cases are possible. We choose " > 0 small enough to make sure that 0 < p i < t for all i 2 N and A (P ) = fS; S 0 g : By (ef ), c f (P ) 2 fS; S 0 g: Then, if c f (P ) = S set S S 0 and if
S S
Since f satis…es (iic), is well de…ned because it does not depend on the particular chosen problem, namely given P 0 2 P such that A (P 0 ) = fS; S 0 g we have that c f (P 0 ) = c f (P ) : Thus, is well de…ned.
By Lemma 11 and Lemma 13 in Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012b), is complete, antisymmetric, monotonic, responsive and transitive. By Lemma 12 in Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2012b) we have that c f (P ) S for all S 2 A(P )nc f (P ) : We should note that in (ete) is independent of the other properties.
Let f 3 be de…ned as in the independence of the properties of Theorem 1. Let be a monotonic and responsive order on N . We de…ne f 3; from f 3 as we did with f 1; .
It is not di¢ cult to prove that f 3; satis…es all properties but (ete).
Let f 4 be de…ned as in the independence of the properties of Theorem 1. Let be a monotonic and responsive order on N . We de…ne f 4; from f 4 as we did with f 1; .
It is not di¢ cult to prove that f 4; satis…es all properties but (bm).
(iic) is independent of the other properties.
Let N = f1; 2g and be such that f1; 2g f1g f2g ;:
We de…ne f 5 as follows. For all P 2 P; f 5 (P ) = ( (0; t) if f2g 2 A(P ); N = 2 A(P ); and t 1 U otherwise.
It is not di¢ cult to prove that f 5 satis…es all properties but (iic).
(cons) is independent of the other properties.
Let be a monotonic order on N but not responsive. We de…ne f 6 = U :
It is not di¢ cult to prove that f 6 satis…es all properties but (cons).
Proof of Proposition 2
Let be any monotonic and responsive order on N :
(1) U satis…es envy freeness. Let P 2 P and i; j 2 c U be such that U i (P ) j U j (P ) :
Since U satis…es consistency, U k (P ) = U k (P c U ) for all k 2 c U : Thus, we can assume that c U = N ; namely, P 2 P and U = U: We consider two cases.
1. P k2N p k < t: Then, U k (P ) = max fp k ; minfu k ; gg p k for all k 2 N . Since U i (P ) j U j (P ) ; U j (P ) = minfu j ; g > p j : We consider two cases. (3) U satis…es one-sided resource monotonicity. Let P; (P nt 0 ) 2 P be as in the de…nition of the property. Since A (P ) = A (P nt 0 ) and U satis…es (iic), c U (P ) = c U (P nt 0 ). Since U satis…es (cons), and using similar arguments to those already used to prove that U is envy free, we can assume that P 2 P and U = U: We consider two cases. By single-peakedness, U i (P nt 0 ) i U i (P ) :
The proof is symmetric to the prove of Case 1 and it is omitted.
(1 0 ) U does not satisfy strong envy freeness. Let P 2 P be such that N = f1; 2g ; t = 10; l = (7; 0), u = (9; 9) and for each x 2 [1; 3] and y 2 [7; 9] we have that y 2 x: The set of feasible allocations is F A (P ) = f(x 1 ; 10 x 1 ) j x 1 2 [7; 9]g [ f(0; 0)g :
Since U is e¢ cient, U (P ) 6 = (0; 0) ; which means that U does not satisfy strong envy freeness.
(2 0 ) U does not satisfy strong individual rationality from equal division. Let P 2 P be such that N = f1; 2g ; t = 10; l = (1; 2), u = (3; 8) and p 2 = 5: The set of feasible allocations is F A (P ) = f(x 1 ; 10 x 1 ) j x 1 2 [2; 3]g [ f(0; 0)g ; which means that U does not satisfy strong individual rationality from equal division. Since U is e¢ cient, for each i 2 f1; 2g, f i (P ) 2 [4; 6] and f i (P nt 0 ) 2. Thus, U does not satisfy strong one-sided resource monotonicity.
